:: 10/23/2002 ::

Social Morality and Individual Ideal P.F.Strawson (Philosophy vol. 36, Jan 1961)


Synopsis

There a multitude of visions men or a man might have of the “ideal forms of life” that is which ways, or by which principles, life might be lived most fully or correctly. The multiplicity of these ideals is such that they cannot help but contradict one another.

Our sympathies as to various ideals need not necessarily be expressed in our deeds, one life would not be sufficient to test every thesis we might have as to the ideal mode of life and we might wish to see every thesis tested through the lives of others if not through our own. That these ideals may contradict one another is a sure indicator that conflict is likely to result between individuals holding conflicting views.

These are ethical considerations; considerations that govern human choices and decisions and which might also be characterised as an area in which principles are in contradiction of one another. The nature of the relationship between morality and ethics is unclear. There exist many expressions of ethical profundity in literature, religion and mythology and so on that may exist as part of a system or simply in a maxim. One might dismiss the notion that these are in fact truths at all yet they captivate and shape our vision of our ethical ideal repeatedly and strikingly from various sources in such a way that we wish to, and do, attribute to them truth. It seems to be the case that these could not be moulded into a coherent whole whilst remaining faithful to the integrity of each contribution.

For a community to be said to exist there must be in place principles or rules which one must act in accordance with if one is to be considered a member of the community and corresponding privileges that follow from that observation (the “minimal idea of morality”). This recognition is the minimum that might be required for a community to exist and function; and this in turn is a requirement essential for life to be worth living we might all agree, but not a requirement that has any consequence in and of itself.

Morality, it might be argued, is of consequence in and of itself and not just as an incidental requirement of the formation of communities, without which no form of ideal can be pursued. To this it may be said that morality as understood by individuals is an attempt to reconcile their personal ethical ideals with the rule morality of the community in which they find themselves, which at least might persuade us that this “minimal idea of morality” is worthy of consideration in terms of this description. Whilst this might not seem to be morality that is universal, in the sense of detailing specific rules which obtain under every circumstance, it is universal in that to behave morally in a given community is to participate in the rights and duties concomitant with membership of that community, and those rights and duties are likely to be prescribed or at least understood in specific terms.

This “minimal idea of morality” is a “socially sanctioned demand made on an individual in virtue merely of his membership of the society in question”. The definition is flexible enough to recognise the variety of social groups and indeed groups within groups. It also allows us to make sense of terms like “duty” and “obligation” straightforwardly rather than by reference to something opaque. The moral force they hold is due to the fact that recognition and response to duties and obligations in accordance with a certain kind of membership in a certain kind of society is to behave morally by our definition, and to enable the pursuit of individual ideals.

For this to hold true it must added that the members of the community must have either, or perhaps both, a stake in the sanctioning process or interests that are served by the existence of the community based on “socially sanctioned demands”. Thus we have the idea of members of the community being in some sense stakeholders not merely in the idea of a community based on socially sanctioned demands but in the system of socially sanctioned demands in which they participate, characterised by the mutual acknowledgement of demands both on and of the individual members. The acceptance of the equivalence of demands made on others and the demands made on oneself is the recognition of moral demands and human nature is such that most people will not attempt to “free ride” on the benevolence of others but will recognise the give and take that is required. This “reciprocity of claim” is something at the essence of morality. What is required is not a set of rules that obtain in every circumstance but the recognition that rights in a certain community are attached to corresponding duties to that community; and that one follows the other is universally the case.

It is likely that certain features will prevail under most conceivable communal arrangements, perhaps because human nature suggests we all have interest in them; justice, the prohibition of violence amongst community members or that members should not deceive one another (at least in certain matters).

There is scope for moral criticism within the bounds of this concept in that the terms in which it is framed are loose enough to allow debate as to the appropriateness/equivalence of certain rights vis a vis the duties a given community demands. The interaction between the concept itself and the criticism within that framework of communities contain the essence of what we understand to be morality. It is a conception that develops and shapes communities over time.

The relation between individual ideals in the first instance and social morality thus rests in the requirements that some such community exist in which ones individual ideals might be pursued and furthermore the prerequisite for a community to exist being the recognition of rights and duties within its members. The justification for accepting one’s role must be a matter of choice to some extent, at least between alternatives. The model of “recognized reciprocal claim” is an attempt to frame morality in a context where one is concerned by reconciling various and contradictory ethical ideals within a society that can be called moral and yet remain liberal and open toward the pursuit of those aims in a cohesive and non-authoritarian way.





Reflections

Is it convincing that his vision of morality is anything other than prudential or self-interested? As it stands it seems a sensible way of reconciling the pursuit of differing ends along a contractual basis to honour given duties in exchange for certain rights; the quid pro quo of certain societal demands being recognised and honoured in return for certain individual “interests” being met in return. This does rather smack of an exchange that does not seem necessarily to be moral in nature.

However, more convincing is the assertion that were members to feel that they had a stake in determining that the demands made on them were reasonable and that the interest they received fair, in other words that the system was genuinely just (in addition to their simply feeling that it were just – to avoid any consent manufacturing), then something approaching a moral society comes into view.

Whilst this vision might appear satisfactory it also appears remote. In the first instance when can one come to be considered to have consented to membership of a society and the rights and duties that follow from that membership? We are all indeed members of various communities on both a macro and micro level. The membership of the micro communities, a religious group or a set of friends or a club, might rightly be considered a matter of choice, of voluntarily accepting the rights and duties of such a micro community and we might also therein have a more obvious impact on the sanctions such a community might impose and the form that ones “interest” takes from that membership. This sort of community may be closer to the vision of a moral society Strawson depicts.

However, the macro community (ies) to which we belong do not seem to conform to anything like this vision. None of us can be said to have consented to membership of our respective nationalities and what that entails in terms of rights and duties but the conception does appear to allow criticism in terms of the justice of the rights and duties that characterise this macro community. Whether or not we feel that we would consent to membership of such a community given the duties and rights that follow from that membership is in a sense the acid test of whether we see that society to be just. If we would not consent to arrangements as they stand it is an expression of our dissatisfaction with what is asked of us and/or what is given to us and our position in determining one or both (our degree of involvement in the sanctioning process). Where this is the case the moral fabric, under this conception, of a community collapses; obedience to its rules no longer has moral force and a reorganisation is required until satisfactory relations do obtain.

:: alan 16:31 [link] ::

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