:: 4/19/2004 ::

Tradition or Translation? Cynical or Sacred?
The Rise of Islamic Radicalism among British Bangladeshis

The identity of Muslim communities in Britain and Europe is informed in part by the perceived situation of many Muslim states. Both are poor and divided, confronted by many problems, economic, political and ideological. They find themselves oppressed and exploited by western, secular capitalism. Post-modern ways of understanding the world and ourselves draw similar local/global parallels between changing notions of identity and globalisation. Contradictory identities can exist side by side in one individual, whilst different cultures collide and mix in our ‘shrinking’ world. This volatile situation has many contributing phenomena. The experience of migration is among the most important, bringing different cultures into contact and challenging old notions of the nation-state. Migration is at once a cause and effect of these changes. It has had a profound influence on new currents in Islam, for example. While Islam has also played a major part in the construction of new identities for some migrants.

This paper aims to examine the background and reasons for the rise of Islamic radicalism amongst British Bangladeshis. Islamic ‘fundamentalism’, anti- western sentiments and the politicisation of Islam have been dominant themes in the media and public consciousness in recent years. Why have Islam and western secular democracy come to be seen as irreconcilable enemies? Why do British citizens choose to prioritise or emphasise their Islamic identity over and against their British identity? Why are radical forms of political Islam attractive? These are questions that will be examined here.

This is not an exhaustive overview of either Bangladeshi migration to Britain or modern Islamic trends. It attempts to explain the relationships between migration, minorities and radical politics within the context of contemporary Britain and it’s Bangladeshi community. A brief history of the Bangladeshi community in Britain will be followed by a discussion of culture, hegemony and identity. An analysis of the changing identity of British Bangladeshis will touch on issues of exclusion and racism. These ideas will then be fitted into the wider context of Islam and Islamic radicalism in the world. An overview of politics and current affairs will also suggest some possible reasons for the rise of Islamic radicalism in the world and why it has become attractive to Bangladeshis in Britain.

British Bangladeshis

Most Muslims in Britain come from the Indian Subcontinent, the majority from Pakistan, followed by Indian and Bangladeshi Muslims. Migration to Britain from the Indian sub-continent has a long history, linked by the relationship of empire, South Asians came to Britain.

Many Bangladeshis worked as sailors, and ‘jumped ship’, establishing small communities in major ports around the world in the 19th and early 20th centuries. These communities were largest in Britain due to the colonial ties and the possibilities of finding further employment on ships. They were centred in major ports such as London, Cardiff, South Shields and Sunderland (Carey and Shukur, 1985:406).

The majority of Bangladeshis came to Britain in the 1950s and 60s. They were mostly single men, and were helped by friends or kin amongst the earliest arrivals. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act reinforced this pattern as friends and kin found it easier to be sponsored under the voucher system. These migrants at first saw themselves as temporary work migrants rather than settlers; the ‘myth of return’ was ever present in their minds. They came in search of high wages rather than as a response to poverty (Carey and Shukur, 1985 and Gardner and Shukur, 1994:147) By the mid sixties, this began to change and family reunification in Britain began. First sons, then wives and other children slowly started to arrive (Carey and Shukur, 1985:407, and Eade, 1997:149).

There are now approximately 300,000 British citizens of Bangladeshi origin (National Statistics), most of them in London. Most British Bangladeshis are from Sylhet, a region in the north east of Bangladesh, and the vast majority are Muslim. Bangladeshis and Bangladeshi culture have become a part of the dynamic ‘British culture’. (Carey and Shukur, 1985:405 and Amit, 2003:14-16). A look at some ways of understanding culture will help us analyse this process.

What are culture and hegemony?

Antonio Gramsci saw hegemony as more fluid and contested than previous analysts. Previous ideas saw hegemony as domination by one state, country or culture within a group of others. The idea of a dominant culture was seen as a situation of uncontested political domination. Gramsci (re)interpreted hegemony as: “the process of gaining legitimate consent within the functional universe of civil society, as opposed to simply holding it together through a monopoly on the means of violence.” (Adamson, 1980:10). People are not coerced by dominant culture, but accept dominant ideas whilst also empowered to challenge them from below. The hegemonic culture is not rigid and unchanging but a flexible, dynamic domination. Raymond Williams has also contributed to modern understandings of hegemony. He maintains that hegemony is always an evolving process rather than a rigid structure. This process of evolution is aided by cultures that fall outside the ‘horizons of thought and action’ set by the hegemonic culture. Culture then, is a battlefield, a contest between competing forces of society, dominated by the hegemonic group, all attempting to impose their interpretation of the meaning of objects or practices on the rest of society (ibid.).

Culture is: “… symbolization, grounded in the material world as symbolically appropriated and produced. In class societies, where surplus production is appropriated by the dominant group, symbolic production is likewise seized as hegemonic class culture” (Cosgrove, in Rose 1993:90)

In this case, British or English culture is the hegemonic culture and it is being challenged and forced to evolve by many ‘cultures of resistance’, amongst them, that of Islamic radicalism. There are many forms of resistance to hegemony, political, economic and cultural. Culturally there are many points of ‘conflict’ between strict Islamic codes and ‘British’ or ‘western’ culture. Most of these surround sex, sexuality and gender. Issues such as polygamy, pre-marital sex, abortion, hijab or burka, (the veil), and wider issues of female modesty and gender roles are all sources of cultural conflict (Gardner and Shukur, 1994:156, Modood, 1992:264, Jamaat-e-Islam, 2004).

Culture is constantly changing in reaction to the contestation of meaning. In a ‘multicultural society’, this conflict is bound to be intense. The phenomena of capitalism and globalisation have had significant effects on many cultures (Hall, 1992:308). Globalisation brings more, and more varied cultures into contact across large physical, economic, political and cultural distances making the “encounter of colonial centre and colonised periphery immediate and intense” (Robins, 1991, cited in ibid:305). Contact between people and cultures happens through improvements in communication technology, but most influentially through migration. This increase in cross cultural contact and interaction also leads to the strengthening of local identities as a defensive reaction to the presence and ‘challenge’ of other cultures. Notions of “revamped Englishness” are one manifestation of this (Hall, 1992:308).

Hall explains how immigrant communities may undergo a “strategic retreat” to “defensive identities” in response to racism and exclusion. This involves a re-identification with the cultures in their country of origin. In response to exclusion, people often ask themselves about what, or who, they really are. The construction of strong new counter cultures amongst second-generation immigrants is also a feature of this retreat. A good example of this is the identification with Africa, through Rastafarian imagery, of Afro-Caribbean youth in Britain. The third feature Hall associates with this retreat is the revival of cultural traditionalism, religious orthodoxy and political separatism, which has occurred amongst some Muslims (Hall, 1992:308, also Ahmed, 2004).

Ethnic boundaries

Ethnicity is a concept that is hard to pin down. Barth’s (1969) work on ethnic boundaries does not see ethnicity as rooted or as something that one is born with, or as a type of ‘essence’. Like identity, ethnicity is often about boundaries and exclusion, as Cohen describes in the quote below. Barth’s ethnic boundaries can be real or symbolic, visible or invisible. The boundaries can be based on territory, history, language, economics, or a range of symbolic identifications. The stress on the importance of ethnic boundaries rather than groups seems to concur with Cohen’s ideas below (Cohen, 1994:199). Wallman’s (1986) work follows up on Barth’s, and adds that these boundaries are only formed when the differences between people are ‘heated’ into significance by what are called the ‘identity investments’ of either side (ibid.). The degree to which people are passive participants in ethnicity, or choose ethnicities for themselves is interesting to consider. Perhaps migrants are uniquely place to be able to choose their ethnicity.

“One only knows who one is by who one is not. The processes of exclusion and rejection uncover and reveal and become constitutive of the national identity itself.” (Cohen, 1994:198)

The importance of identity

Hall (1992) identifies three conceptions of identity. The ‘enlightenment subject’, which is an individualist, essentialist concept of identity in which one’s identity is with one from birth. The sociological subject is a more modern interpretation, in which identity is formed by the interaction between the self and society. Finally, Hall concentrates on the post-modern subject; ‘fractured’ and ‘de-centred’, the post-modern subject is composed of several, often contradictory or unresolved identities (Hall, 1992:275-6).

Cohen (1994) calls this de-centring the ‘humbling’ of the human ego, and identifies several scientific advances that have led to this. Gallileo’s discovery that the earth is not the centre of the universe, Darwin’s theory that humans are descended from apes, Freud and Lacan’s work on the unconscious, and Marx’s emphasis on the importance of economic forces (Cohen, 1994:205). Hall also mentions these de-centring forces, and cites Marx, who asserted that “men make history, but only on the basis of conditions which are not of their making”, essentially, that we are slaves of the mode of production and historical conditions (Hall,1992:286). Hall adds to these factors, modern socio-political movements such as feminism (Hall, 1992:290). In the post-modern conception of the world, culture and identity are in a constant state of flux and contest (Cohen, 1994:192).

While immigrant communities may ‘retreat’ into ‘tradition’ they may also see a ‘translation’ of their culture and identity. Hall cites Rushdie (1991) and Parekh (1989) in his discussion of these phenomena. ‘Translation’ of cultures may lead to ‘hybrid cultures’, which involve multiple identities and new types of identities (Hall, 1992:310).

In Parekh’s discussion of the ‘Satanic Verses affair’, he claims Rushdie is a champion of the post-modern, hybrid identity. He questions everything, shifting between admiration and ambivalence for his community and nation (Parekh, 1989). Parekh uses a similar idea to the dichotomy between ‘tradition’ and ‘translation’. He pessimistically describes how immigrants’ “dignity as human beings [is] constantly mocked by the hostile ‘host’ society”. This leads to doubt, suspicion and subdued rage amongst immigrant communities towards the host society. Under these circumstances, some get very cynical, as Parekh claims Rushdie has. These people doubt everything, and live in a ‘moral void’. Others undergo the ‘retreat’ strategy, retreating to a “sacred text, body of rituals or pool of traditions”. Immigrants look for an identity and culture of their own, in a society that has rejected them. Possession of their own identity distinguishes them and “gives them a past, roots in the present and the confidence to face the future”. It gives these groups certainty in the moral void and protection against cynicism. Therefore, at one extreme, there is a “deep and self destructive doubt” with no sense of the sacred; and at the other an “impenetrable and intolerant certainty” in the sacred. The majority of Muslims, claims Parekh, “give meaning to their poor and empty lives by holding on to the holy and it’s rock like certainties” (Parekh, 1989).

Parekh’s seem pessimistic, and his analysis of the situation of Musilms may be too negative. However, recent reports of ‘Islamophobia’ such as Dalrymple’s (2004), written in response to rising hostility and ignorance of Islam and the Islamic world, appear to concur. Dalrymple writes passionately, responding to Robert Kilroy Silk’s startlingly ignorant article in the Daily Express. The ‘Islamophobia’ described by Dalrymple has been noted many others, it is the title of a Runnymede Trust report, and is mentioned by Castles and Miller (2003). Castles and Miller and Nielsen (1997) point out the ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’ of Islamophobia, that fear and exclusion will lead to increasing mistrust and hostility from the Muslim community. Neilsen describes how Islam is seen in an ‘Orwellian’ sense as the ‘new enemy’ in the post-Cold War era (Castles and Miller, 2003:239 and Neilsen, 1997:272).

Dalrymple’s summary of shocking racism, misunderstanding and propaganda in the press is mirrored in Vertovec and Peach’s book ‘Islam in Europe’, in which they lament the widespread fear and hostility towards Islam. They mention the Oklahoma bombing in 1995, when the front cover of Today magazine had a horrific photo of the victims and the headline ‘In the Name of Islam’; the bomber turned out to be a blond haired, blue eyed, all American man. (Vertovec and Peach, 1997:4). This fact was forgotten in the ensuing harsh immigration and anti-terrorist laws (Choudry, 2001). These depressing reports appear to confirm Parekh’s gloomy view.

Changing Identities, Exclusion and Alienation

Muslims have become prominent in Britain and Europe in recent years. In Britain, there are over a million Muslims (Modood, 1992:260), but they have a presence in British consciousness beyond their numbers. Kepel links this entry into public consciousness to the Arab - Israeli conflict in 1973, (Kepel, 1997:45) the oil crisis, increasing immigration for settlement and the abandonment of the ‘myth of return’ in response to stricter immigration laws, (ibid:48). Their prominence in the public arena has also been due to high profile political events. Politics, popular culture and the media shape our view of an already complex world (Choudry, 2001, Vertovec and Peach, 1997:4, Dalrymple, 2004). Within both the South Asian and Islamic communities in Britain and worldwide there is a diverse plurality, debates and conflicts (Kepel, 1997:50) that must be taken into account to avoid crude generalisations and essentialising.

The experience of migration and diaspora can lead to shifting notions of identity, the formation of new identities and hybrid identities (Eade, 1997:147). Experiences of racism and exclusion are also influential in identity formation and ethnic mobilisation. Europe’s Muslims suffer from various forms of socio-economic, political and physical exclusion, and many of them live in relative deprivation. Vertovec and Peach’s picture of the situation of European Muslims is bleak. They are described as “divided and traumatised, weakened by unemployment and humiliated by dependence on social welfare”. They suffer from anti-Islamism, described above, harsh immigration regimes, and fear of persecution, along with economic problems such as unemployment. (Vertovec and Peach, 1997:5). In Britain, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have the highest rates of unemployment, the lowest rates of educational qualifications and the highest profile in manual work of any ‘non-white’ group (Modood, 1992:261). British Muslims are further excluded from politics and education (Dalrymple, 2004, and Eade, 1997:149).

Simultaneously, claim Vertovec and Peach, there is a new self-consciousness amongst European Muslims. More Islamic organisations and associations have been formed, and this creates increasing engagement in politics and society (Vertovec and Peach, 1997:6). Perhaps this is due to the decrease in the strength of the ‘myth of return’ and an increasing feeling of permanence. Perhaps it is a second-generation effect, with the greater confidence and feeling of belonging in the hybrid identities of the second generation. Vertovec and Peach identify changes in Islam in Europe (ibid:9), which some say are part of a ‘politics of difference’ and anti-racism. Others, they say, claim it is part of a ‘worldwide Islamic awakening (ibid:10).

There is certainly a group of European and British Muslims who are attracted to Islamic radicalism (Taher, 2000, Gardner and Shukur, 1994:161). This group emphasise their Muslim identity over other political and cultural identities (Eade, 1997:155, and Gardner and Shukur, 1994:163). Young Muslims reclaim Islam for themselves, “choosing to break away culturally on the basis of communal identity from the dominant values of the nations of which they are citizens in principle, but from which, according to them, they are excluded in practice”. They struggle against exclusion, racism, drug addiction, violence and delinquency; strict respect for religious prohibition is therefore important for them (Vertovec and Peach, 1997:52). "The main thing with our teenagers is a drug problem, not a religious problem," says Bashrhan Khan, interviewed in Waldman’s article on the ‘Tipton Taliban’, (Waldman, 2002). This message of people turning to ‘fundamentalist’ forms of Islam as a response to racism and exclusion is one repeated again and again by commentators.

The first generation of Bangladeshis were more attached to their national identity as Bangladeshis, than the second who are more attracted to Islam (Gardner and Shukur, 1994:163). Many second generation Bangladeshis do not feel a strong bond with Bangladesh. On visits home they feel and emphasise their British identity. They feel out of place and alienated (ibid:159. The draw of Islam may be stronger amongst those who feel little association with either a racist British society or with Bangladesh (ibid:162).

Racism associated with the nation, patriotism, and culture is increasingly common. This type of racism is socially, culturally or ideologically constructed, it has moved away from crude biological notions of inferiority and superiority. ‘The nation’ is constructed as a unified cultural community (Gilroy, 1992:87, cited in Hall, 1992:298, and Cohen, 1994:193) in the works of commentators such as Michael Walzer (1983). Hall points out that no nations are racially pure (Hall, 1992:298). Nationalism is a discourse, a construct, analysed so well by Benedict Anderson, who famously, described nations as ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983:15-16).

Gilroy, Hall, Cohen, Parekh and Modood speak of a new type of ‘cultural racism’ emerging. Edward Said might disagree about this newness, having analysed a deeply entrenched, and ancient set of constructions about ‘the Orient’ in his book ‘Orientalism’ (1978). Hall links the re-emergence of nationalism and other forms of ‘particularism’ to globalisation, which has not seen the victory of global, logical, universal values. He claims that globalisation has led to contradictory values and phenomena (Hall, 1992:314). Hall’s analysis of the macro cosmos of globalisation is similar to his ideas about the micro cosmos of identity. His, is a discourse of a de-centred, self-contradictory, post-modern world. He concludes by stating that the processes of globalisation may be part of the continuing story of ‘de-centring the west’ (ibid.).

Anti-racist movements have contributed to the mobilisation of 'racialised minorities' around culture and religion (Solomos and Black, 1996:97 and Eade, 1997:146). Solomos and Black analyse notions of ‘black identity’ and the work of Tariq Modood. These anti racist ideas, they claim, over emphasise simple notions of racism, ignoring the complex ethnic mix of the group identified as `black`. Modood argues in response; “everybody is somebody, not just a victim.” (Solomos and Black, 1996:135).

The Muslim scholar Omar Khalidi (1989) claims that there is no conflict of interests between Muslims and a non-Muslim state. The majority of European Muslims are politically moderate, not very religious, or practice their religion individually. They are often overlooked (Vertovec and Peach, 1997:38), by right wing analysts or the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ school of thought. Most Muslims take the view that outside Islamic countries, they are under a political obligation to live as responsible citizens of the society in which they find themselves (King, 1997:142). Taher echoes this in his analysis of British Asian attitudes towards the British Government. He reports, “most Asians condemn those youths fighting for the Taliban as much as anyone else in this country. Our survey showed that 72% thought that it was wrong for Muslim youths to fight for the Taliban” (Taher, 2001). It is important to remember this quiet and peaceful majority when discussing an infamous and high profile minority.

Islamic Fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism is an over-used and misunderstood term, used to describe various militant currents in contemporary Islamic thought. Youssef Choueiri identifies three currents of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. ‘Revivalism’ emerged as an internal dialogue within Islam in the eighteenth century. It grew from remote rural areas beyond the reach of authorities. It’s most famous manifestation is now in ‘Wahabism’ in Saudi Arabia (Choueiri, 1990:9).

Islamic reformism was an urban movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It’s intellectual leaders studied European success and dominance, in an attempt to reverse what they saw as ‘Islamic decline’ (ibid.). Revivalism and reformism were eclipsed by the formation of sovereign states in many Islamic regions, as independence was granted to states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia (ibid:10).

Islamic radicalism has emerged in the twentieth century as a reaction to the growth of the nation state. It is popular amongst migrants, both internationally and internally in the great era of urbanisation. Islamic “radicalism does not revive or reform. Rather it creates a new world and creates its own dystopia.” (ibid:10). Islamic radicalism is the focus of this paper, as it is the most recent, relevant type of Islamic fundamentalism, and relates most closely with the general public usage of the term.

Islamic radicalism reflects, and is a response to, the social divisions and problems of Islamic cities. The rise of Islamic radicalism is linked with the growth of cities since 1945; it is linked to the anxieties and ambitions of certain groups in society. Choueiri identifies these as; small merchants, middle traders, artisans, students, teachers and civil servants (ibid:12). Many of these people are migrants, either internally in processes of urbanisation or internationally, as in the case of British Bangladeshis.

The messages of Islamic radicalism are stridently anti-western. Scholars such as Maududi (1992) (founder of the Jammat-I-Islami movement in South Asia) and Qutb offer convincing and coherent criticism of secular democracy and ‘western’ values and politics. They eloquently criticise socialism, capitalism, colonialism, secular democracy and the ‘pagan materialism’ (jahiliyya-madiyya) of the west (ibid:95). Their arguments are compelling and many of them overlap with those of European movements, such as anti-capitalism.

Ali Shariati (1988) points out that “economism is the fundamental principle of the philosophy of life in Western industrial society”, citing Francis Bacon’s claim that “science abandons it’s search for truth and turns to the search for power” (Shariati, 1988:315). It is hard to disagree with some of these arguments, but Shariati goes on to dismiss all other political philosophies and world religions. He claims that Islam must have a central role in the organisation of society (ibid:322). Shariati’s critique of Marxism is interesting in that he attacks precisely the aspect of Marxism which Hall and Cohen identify as a de-centring force on identity. He despises Marx’s ‘materialistic determinism’ (ibid:317) echoing Qutb’s critique of Communism, saying that it deprives man of his ‘essence’ (Choueiri, 1990:118) . Shariati also criticises what he calls ‘biologism’ and ‘sociologism’ (Shariati, 1988:317) i.e. Darwinism and the sociology identified by Hall in the ‘sociological subject’. Cohen and Hall identify these forces as de-centring post-modern identities. Presumably, therefore, Shariati does not share Hall and Cohen’s post-modern views on identity mentioned in this paper.

Maududi and Qutbs' political ideas are bound up in the all importance of Islam and Allah in society. “Sovereignty and legitimacy are unassailably placed beyond the realm of human endeavour”, Secularism and democracy are seen as a usurpation of Allah’s sovereignty (Choueiri, 1990:105, Taher, 2000). Democracy is therefore, a direct violation of divine laws and a reversion to the days of pagan ignorance (jahiliyya), secularism meanwhile, is said to lead to corruption, oppression and treachery (Choueiri, 1990:106). “For Maududi the idea of social justice is a stratagem of Satan to intrigue humans” (ibid:116). Maududi and Qutb do entertain some ideas that seem ridiculous or racist to a secular European scholar. The Zionist and Christian conspiracies, planning to undermine Islam or rid the world of spirituality all together are examples (ibid:107). The association of Jews with Capitalism and usury is a recurring theme, as is the idea that Communism is also a Jewish plot (ibid:119, Waldman, 2002).

These types of radical ideas have reached Britain and the most angry and violent strains of Islamic radicalism are being preached here. ‘Dirty Kuffar’, the violent ‘jihad rap’ song released on the internet and distributed though mosques, reported by Barnett, (2004) demonstrated the depths of hatred that exist. Britain has become a world centre of Islamic thought, action and dissidence (Waldman, 2002). Islam in Britain is changing, Gardner and Shukur point out that a “heightened commitment to Islam, allows those involved both to express their frustrations with mainstream British society and to join a worldwide trend which links them politically and financially to global ummah” (Gardner and Shukur, 1994:163 and Amit, 2003:24). The argument of many, such as Margaret Hall, is that Islam has become more traditional and institutionalised (Margaret Hall, 1996:104). Gardner and Shukur point to the role of transnational communities and diaspora in the formation and construction of new currents within Islam. The effect of these linkages has been to increase the importance of events throughout the Muslim world on communities outside it. Solidarity with Muslims in other countries and a Global worldview are also features of this (Gardner and Shukur, 1994:163). These new forms of Islam see Islam as a ‘total’ political system (Amit, 2003:11). The continual comparison and interaction with the west has led to change, hybridity, and ambivalence in both Islam and ‘the West’.

The effect of Politics

Political events have played a crucial role in the formation and popularity of Islamic radicalism and other currents in Islam. A series of events and controversies from the eighties until today has stimulated and maintained the strength and appeal of Islamic radicalism and other forms of political Islam (Amit, 2004:11). Amit lists Halal food in schools and prisons, the headscarf debates, and the Rushdie affair, alongside global geopolitical developments as sources of conflict and attraction to forms of political Islam (ibid).

In 1990, Bernhard Lewis wrote an article called ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, in which he maintains that the struggle of Islamic fundamentalists is against secularism and modernism, he also coined the term ‘clash of civilisations’ to describe his predictions. “Fundamentalist leaders are not mistaken in seeing in Western civilization the greatest challenge to the way of life that they wish to retain or restore for their people” (Lewis, 1990).

Influenced by these ideas, Samuel Huntingdon went on to write the now famous ‘Clash of Civilisations’ (1993). He predicted that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural”. He also states, in direct contrast to Hall’s analysis of globalisation and capitalism, that economic modernization and social change are separating people from local identities. He goes on to say that these forces also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. Which also contradicts the more ‘liberal’ scholars cited above on this topic. He claims that religion has filled this gap in many parts of the world, often in the form of movements that are labelled ‘fundamentalist’ (Huntingdon, 1993).

Huntingdon points the finger of blame for this conflict firmly at Islam, claiming that “Islam has bloody borders”. He cites conflict between Muslims and other groups on the edges of the Muslim world, in Yugoslavia, Philippines, India and Africa as examples. Due to this aggression, he maintains, ‘the West’ must strengthen and protect itself and it’s dominance by limiting the military and economic strength of the Muslim world (Huntingdon 1993).

This article led to a war of words between right wing and liberal scholars. Edward Said responded to Huntingdon’s article with ‘The Clash of Ignorance’ (2001) in which he outlined the long-standing and complex history of conflict, interdependence, mimicry and ambivalence between Islam and Christianity or ’the west’. He points out that Huntington and Lewis do not acknowledge the internal dynamics and plurality of every ‘civilization’. Terms like ‘the west’ and ‘Islam’ are too simplistic, as Kepel also warns. The timing of his article was no accident either, it was published a month after September 11th 2001, Said claims that September 11 has been turned into proof of Huntington's thesis. He balances criticism of ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ by pointing out similar distortions and zealotry in "Jewish" and "Christian" religious and political discourse. Said wisely concludes that “it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice.” (Said, 2001).

It is interesting to note that Maududi and Qutb subscribe to similar ideas about the total incompatibility of western secularism and Islam as Huntingdon does. The similarities in these simplistic notions and inflammatory rhetoric are indicative of the political motivations of their intellectual work and their extremist worldviews.

Recent history in the Middle East reinforces antagonism between the Muslim World and the Anglo-American hegemony (Taher, 2000). Peter Beaumont’s article, ‘The Roots of Muslim Anger’ for the Observer offers a good analysis of this. He identifies Anglo-American attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq and support for Israel as specific grievances. He finds that internal conflicts within the Islamic world are influential and less obvious (Beaumont, 2001). Beaumont cites Professor Abdul Sattar Kassem, a lecturer in political science at the University of Nablus, “What you have to understand is that many Arabs and Muslims want to build an Islamic civilisation in its own right. They blame the West in general - and America in particular - for subjugating that ambition by dividing the Arab world through the dictators that America supports. America has done this by fragmenting the Islamic world, dividing it under rulers it supports. America has perverted the attempts to democratise the Arab world. They are hypocrites. They preach freedom and democracy, but prevent Arabs from enjoying it and exploit their wealth. The final issue is the US support for Israel in tormenting the Palestinians”. (Beaumont, 2001)

These sentiments are common in the Muslim world and beyond. However, Beaumont identifies other sources of rancour. Hazem Saghiyeh, a London-based columnist for the Arabic newspaper Al Hayat, identifies some of the same causes of friction as Professor Kassem, but spreads the blame for the problem more widely. The failure of ‘the Islamic project’ on issues such as governance and modernisation are also crucial factors. This sense of failure has fostered a historic sense of inferiority at Europe’s dominance of the world since the nineteenth century. This is part of the continuous process of self-evaluation with respect to ‘the other’, identified by Hall, Cohen and Said. Feelings of inferiority are coupled with the demographic factors of urbanisation and unequal development. “These are … people who have lost their traditional ways of life but have not become modern, who have not benefited through all their education. It is a recipe for psychological breakdown and hysteria. In the past two decades that gap of expectation has increasingly been filled by the politicisation of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism ” (ibid.).

Deep divisions in the Islamic world itself accompanied the crisis of the nineteenth century. These divided those who argued for reform, modernisation or ‘an Islamic Enlightenment’ and those arguing for Islamic fundamentalism (ibid.). These factors were exacerbated in 1948 when Israel defeated Arab armies. The Military defeats, underdevelopment, lack of democracy and freedom of expression led to the rise of conspiracy theories (ibid.). Theories like those of Maududi and Qutb, blaming America or Jews for their feelings of powerlessness and alienation.

Opportunistic leaders such as Ayatollah Khomeini and Bin Laden understand and manipulate these feelings. Many of the poor and disillusioned see the ideas of Islamic radicalism as a magic solution to their problems (ibid.). In ‘the West’, similar discourses create hatred and fear, from the cultural racism of “orientalism” and the “Clash of Civilisations” through to the self-fulfilling prophecy of “Islamophobia”.

Conclusions

The huge inequalities in the world and the injustice of the ‘new world order’ have created a platform for radical and often violent movements to prosper. The seemingly unassailable empire of American capitalism and western culture are being attacked. They have spawned many cultures of resistance, and among the fiercest, and most attractive is Islamic radicalism.

In the West, this has been countered and aggravated by a sustained media campaign whipping up public fear and hatred of Muslims. Muslims have been tarred with the brush of terrorism, fanaticism and conservatism. It is inaccurate however, to essentialise about groups such as Muslims who are diverse, spread widely across continents and mix in complex ways with other cultures.

In the era of globalisation, this mixing has become ever more complex. There are large diverse Muslim communities in many Western countries. These migrations and the improvements in global communications, have led to the creation of new, hybrid cultures. Muslims’ are oppressed and exploited by Western capital, and excluded from power locally and globally.

The identities of second generation Bangladeshis living in Britain are changing. Over time, with the mixing and inter-actions of different cultures, through the experiences of migration, minority, and exclusion, new identities and cultures are formed and chosen. New links and networks have grown up and Islam has assumed a growing importance as a unifying force for many oppressed peoples around the world.

British Bangladeshis may reject British society for any number of reasons. Poverty, exclusion, racism, or the British government foreign policies, which kill or support the killing of thousands of Muslims every year. Islamic radicalism is one of many paths they could take in response, which for reasons outlined above, is particularly attractive at the moment. The rise of Islamic radicalism has a range of global causes, and it’s popularity among British Bangladeshis is due to the interaction of local factors with global politics. We must remember, however that we are all responsible for the spread of the politics of hate, as it is a response to repression, exclusion, and hopelessness.

As Jason Burke points out in his book `Al-Qaeda`, "The greatest weapon in the war on terrorism is the courage, decency, humour and integrity of the vast proportion of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims. It is this that is restricting the spread of al-Qaeda, not the activities of counter-terrorism experts. Without it, we are lost. There is indeed a battle between the west and men like Bin Laden. But it is not a battle for global supremacy. It is a battle for hearts and minds. And it is a battle that we, and our allies in the Muslim world, are currently losing." (cited in Dalrymple, 2004)


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